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Abu Zubaydah and Publicly Available State Secrets
By: Hunter Rebetti

In 2002, the Pakistani government arrested Abu Zubaydah, a suspected lieutenant of the terrorist group Al Qaeda,
before passing him off to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[1] Early on in Zubaydah’s imprisonment he was moved
between various CIA detention cites.[2] Zubaydah claims the CIA held him in a detention site (aka “black-site”) in Poland
during 2002 and 2003.[3] Neither the CIA, nor any other branch of government, have confirmed that there is a detention site
located in Poland.[4]
In 2010, lawyers representing Zubaydah filed a criminal complaint asking the Polish government to prosecute any
Polish nationals involved in the treatment of Zubaydah.[5] The Polish government requested that the United States send it
information regarding the detention of Zubaydah in Poland under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.[6] The United States
denied this request.[7] Zubaydah’s lawyers filed a 28 U. S. C. § 1782 discovery application that would allow U.S. courts to
subpoena evidence for foreign tribunals.[8] Zubaydah tried to subpoena information from James Mitchell and John Jessen,

former CIA contractors and the architects of the CIA’s post 9/11 torture program.[9] The U.S. government moved to quash
the subpoena, arguing that the information requested is protected under the state secrets doctrine[10] and that Mitchell and
Jessen’s responses could disclose the nature of the CIA’s relationship with foreign governments and actors.[11] The District
Court granted the government’s motion, saying that it was not possible to conduct “meaningful discovery” without disclosing
protected information.[12] Zubaydah requested the use of code names in order to allow the discovery to go forward while
concealing confidential information.[13] This was rejected as well.[14]
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.[15] The Ninth Circuit ruled that any information
that was already publicly known was not subject to protection and ruled that Mitchell and Jessen were no longer government
actors, therefore, any information they divulged would not show that the U.S. government “confirmed or denied” anything
regarding the alleged detention.[16] The court ruled that three areas of information were not protected: (1) information about
the existence of a detention site in Poland, (2) information about the use of torture at this site, and (3) information about the
treatment of Zubaydah at this site.[17]
In April 2022, the Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and quashed the subpoenas.
[18] The majority cited to U.S. v. Reynolds, a case that allowed the government to prevent disclosure of information that
would harm national security interests.[19] Under Reynolds, the government can claim information is privileged when its
disclosure would harm national security interests.[20] It is then up to the court to determine whether or not the information
should be kept quiet.[21] Although the court itself must assess the sufficiency of the government’s privilege claim, “the
showing of necessity which is made,” by the party seeking disclosure of the ostensibly privileged information, “will
determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate.”[22]
The Court said that any response by Mitchell or Jessen to the three categories of questions that are allowed would
confirm the existence of a CIA site in Poland; therefore, the Court must analyze whether the disclosure of the existence of
that site is a protected state secret.[23] The Court agreed with the government’s argument that the disclosure of information
about the CIA’s relationship with a foreign entity would place the CIA’s ability to maintain “clandestine relationships” with
this entity and other foreign entities in jeopardy.[24]
Additionally, the majority rejected the idea that discovery could go forward while using codes that would prevent the
disclosure of the location of the site.[25] Justice Breyer argued that because this discovery is meant to be used in a Polish
criminal investigation, even a redacted version of the testimony would make it clear that there is a CIA site in Poland.[26]
In his dissent, Justice Gorsuch lays out the sequence of events the Zubaydah suffered through and explains where these
details have been made publicly available.[27] Justice Gorsuch concedes that the President has broad authority over foreign
affairs.[28] But he argues that the Constitution provided Congress with power to regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts,
and with that power, Congress passed a statute allowing the courts to order discovery from domestic persons for use in
foreign tribunals.[29] This is not to say that Justice Gorsuch is against the state secrets privilege as a whole, just that the
executive’s power to control state secrets should be considered along with the competing interests of the legislature and

judiciary.[30] Justice Gorsuch argues that the executive should not just be taken at their word about national security threats,
as there have been various instances in the past where the government exaggerated or entirely lied about such threats to
prevent the release of compromising or embarrassing information.[31] Justice Gorsuch argues that the government did not do
enough to prove that the disclosure of this information would be a threat to national security. Justice Gorsuch also says that
the government has not done enough to show that there would be a threat to national security, rather it only said that there
would be a threat and the court took it at its word and asked Zubaydah to disprove it, essentially flipping the burden of proof
onto Zubaydah.[32]
Gorsuch then goes on to discuss the fact that the case should not be dismissed even if the location of the site is a state
secret.[33] Gorsuch makes the case that discovery regarding the treatment of Zubaydah should go forward and the parties can
use code names or go through some other method to prevent any protected information from leaking.[34]
While Reynolds does say that the court should give the executive some deference and avoid in camera reviews when
they are not necessary for the sake of national security, this is a case where the information is already public, so there is
relatively very little potential harm in allowing a judge to review the government’s claim that national security is at risk. This
case sets an extremely low bar for determining whether or not national security is at risk due to the disclosure of evidence in a
suit against the government. The court admittedly just took the Director’s word as fact with no other analysis required.[35] If
the government’s burden of proof can be overcome by a simple declaration with no further evidence, there might as well be a
blanket privilege for all evidence which might embarrass the government or its actors. This is a recipe that is bound to result
in governmental abuse of power.
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